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Summary 
This report examines the antipoverty effects of unemployment insurance benefits over the past 
recession and through the beginning of the economic recovery. The analysis highlights the impact 
of the additional and expanded unemployment insurance (UI) benefits available to unemployed 
workers through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, RL. 111-5) and the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program (Title IV of RL. 110-252). In 2009, 
approximately 62% of all unemployed individuals were receiving UI benefits and thus were 
directly impacted by legislative changes to the UI system. 
Estimates presented in this report are based on Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of 
23 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC), administered from 1988 to 2010. The period examined 
includes the three most recent economic recessions. 
This report contributes to this recent research on the antipoverty effects of unemployment 
insurance in several ways. Its period of analysis allows comparisons across the three most recent 
recessions. The report includes estimates of the effects on the poverty rate for the unemployed, 
for those receiving UI, and for families that report at least one family member receiving UI. It 
also estimates how much of the total reported UI benefits went directly to decreasing family 
poverty levels. 
This report's analysis shows that UI benefits appear to reduce the incidence of poverty 
significantly among the population that receives them. The programs' poverty reduction effects 
appear to be especially important during and immediately after recessions. The analysis also finds 
that there was a markedly higher impact on poverty in 2009 than in the previous two recessionary 
periods. The estimated antipoverty effects of UI benefits in 2009 were about twice that of two 
previous peak years of unemployment—1993 and 2003. This may be attributable to the 
temporary provisions of ARRA and the EUC08 program that increased both benefit levels and 
benefit duration. 
• In 2009, about one-quarter (24.3%) of unemployed people who received UI 
benefits would have been considered poor prior to counting the UI benefits they 
received; after counting UI benefits, their poverty rate was cut by well over half, 
to 10.5%. 
• The poverty rate for persons in families who received unemployment benefits in 
2009 was approximately half of what it would have been without those 
unemployment benefits. 
• In 2009, UI benefits lifted an estimated 3.3 million people out of poverty, 
including nearly 1 million children living with a family member who received UI 
benefits. 
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Introduction 
A period of unemployment greatly increases the odds that a worker and members of the worker's 
family will be counted among the nation's poor. For example, among persons between the ages of 
16 and 64 who were unemployed in early 2010, nearly one in four (24.1%) were poor based on 
their families' incomes in 2009; among those who were employed, 6.7% were poor.1 
A variety of social insurance benefits may be available for unemployed workers. The benefits 
analyzed in this report can be generically grouped into the category of Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) benefits. UI benefits provide a cash supplement to replace a portion of lost wages to 
qualified unemployed individuals. Two main objectives of the joint federal-state unemployment 
insurance program are to provide temporary and partial wage replacement to involuntarily 
unemployed workers and to stabilize the economy during recessions.2 
As a temporary, partial replacement of lost earnings due to job loss, the benefits workers receive 
may help to prevent them and their family members from reaching poverty, an ancillary but 
important role of the program. Unemployment benefits are an individual worker's entitlement (as 
long as that worker meets the criteria for the benefit) and are not means tested.3 In this regard, the 
UI program, while not a poverty program per se, can play an important role in reducing poverty 
associated with job loss. 
Additionally, as a countercyclical program UI has a macroeconomic effect in reducing poverty. 
By injecting dollars into the economy directed toward those who have experienced job loss, UI 
helps to partially mitigate income loss among a group directly affected by economic downturn, 
and it thereby temporarily augments the ability of unemployed workers to meet basic needs, 
which further stimulates the economy. In this regard, the macroeconomic effect of UI helps 
dampen the tendency for poverty to increase during periods of economic downturn. 
Roadmap 
This report examines the antipoverty effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits over the 
past three recessions. The analysis especially focuses on the most recent recession, from which 
the economy has only just begun to recover. It highlights the impact of the additional and 
expanded benefits available to unemployed workers in response to the most recent recession. 
Estimates presented in this report are based on Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of 
23 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC), administered from 1988 to 2010. The period examined 
1
 CRS Report RL33069, Poverty in the United States: 2009, by Thomas Gabe. 
2
 See, for example, President Franklin Roosevelt's remarks at the signing of the Social Security Act at 
http://www.ss&gov/?history/?fdrstmts.htrnl#signing. 
3
 By interpretation, entitlement to unemployment benefits cannot be restricted by means tests. See the Labor 
Secretary's interpretation on means testing and conformity to U.S. federal law http://ows.doleta.gov/dmstree/uipl/ 
uipl_pre75/uipl_787.htm. 
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includes three economic recessions (July 1990 to March 1991, and March 2001 to November 
2001, each lasting 8 months; and December 2007 to June 2009, lasting 18 months).4 
In examining the role of UI benefits in alleviating poverty, this report does not consider any 
behavioral changes that individuals, employers, or government would have made had the UI 
benefit structure remained at permanent law levels throughout the period of analysis. In fact, if 
the temporary congressional increases in UI benefits had not existed, economic conditions would 
have been different. Some beneficiaries would have altered their behavior in a variety of ways. 
Some would have taken a job earlier or relied on additional hours of work from a spouse. Some 
would have chosen to terminate their job search earlier and move into retirement or apply for 
disability benefits. Absent the additional UI benefits, some might have qualified for other 
government benefits (e.g., food stamps) for which they otherwise would not have been eligible. 
Additionally, some employers also would have made different decisions about hiring and laying 
off workers. 
This report also ignores several important changes in the labor market that have impacted both 
the unemployment rate and the poverty rate during this period. The aging of the labor market over 
time has generally decreased the unemployment rate. This decrease is tempered by the increased 
duration of unemployment as a result of the older profile of the labor market.5 At the same time, 
workers are less likely to be laid off temporarily and more likely to become permanently 
separated from their former job.6 
The report begins with a short section depicting labor market conditions over the 23-year period 
examined. Next is a section describing the Unemployment Insurance system, in terms of the 
permanent UI structure as well as the temporary measures Congress has enacted in reaction to 
poor economic conditions. 
A third section examines the effect of UI benefit receipt on an individual's poverty status. It 
provides estimates of the number of persons who would fall below the nation's official income 
poverty threshold if UI benefits received were not counted as income, and the number lifted 
above the poverty threshold when they are, as well as estimates of the share of unemployed 
persons who are poor, according to whether they received UI benefits during the year. A brief 
summary assesses the relative effects of the Unemployment Insurance system on poverty during 
the past recession compared to two preceding recessions. 
The report contains three appendices. Appendix A provides additional legislative details on the 
temporary measures enacted by Congress during the most recent recession—the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. 
4
 Periods of economic recession are officially designated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Business Cycle Dating Committee. See http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html. 
5
 For an example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Income Security and 
Family Support, What Does the Unemployment Rate Indicate About the Weak Labor Market?, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 
April 10, 2008, http://www.brookings.edU/~/media/Files/rc/testimonies/2008/0410_unemployment_blank/ 
0410_unemploymen t_blank.pdf. 
6
 For an example, see Chart 1 in Wayne Vroman, The Great Recession, Unemployment Insurance and Poverty, Urban 
Institute, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Reducing Poverty and Economic Distress after ARRA, Washington, 
DC, January 15, 2010, http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412072_great_recession.pdf. 
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Appendix B provides data on trends in UI receipt by an individuals' labor market status during a 
year. It provides contextual reference of different measures of labor "underutilization," including 
monthly and annual monthly averages of unemployment compared to estimates for persons 
unemployed at any time during the year (the definition of unemployed used in the report's 
CPS/ASEC analysis). It also examines more expansive definitions of labor utilization, which in 
addition to the unemployed (persons without a job who looked for work) includes involuntary 
part-time workers and discouraged workers (those who did not search for work, believing suitable 
work is not available). This appendix examines UI receipt reported on the CPS/ASEC among 
persons of the above, and other, labor force statuses. 
Appendix C compares CPS/ASEC estimates to UI administrative data benchmarks. It assesses 
the relative quality of the CPS/ASEC UI estimates over the 23-year period examined in the 
report. The CPS/ASEC data undercount UI benefit receipt.7 As a result, this report may 
underestimate the effect of unemployment insurance upon poverty rates. 
Labor Market Context 
Figure 1 depicts the U.S. monthly and annual average monthly unemployment rate8 from January 
1987 to February 2011. The figure shows that in each of the three recessions over the period, the 
unemployment rate is typically at a cyclical low just prior to the onset of economic recession, and 
it tends to continue to rise well beyond the recession's official end. As economic growth begins to 
take hold at a recession's end, employers are typically cautious in hiring new workers, waiting to 
be assured that economic growth is likely to persist. Job growth begins to take hold once existing 
labor capacity becomes stretched and the hiring of additional workers is required to meet 
increasing demand for employer-provided goods and services. The figure shows that in the 1990-
1991 recession, unemployment rose from a pre-recession low of 5.0% in March 1989 to a post-
recession high of 7.8% in June 1992, which was some 15 months after the recession's official 
end. In the subsequent 2000 recession, the unemployment rate rose from a pre-recession low of 
3.8% in April 2000 to a high of 6.3% in June 2003, which was some 19 months after the 
recession's end. In the most recent recession, the unemployment rate rose from a pre-recession 
low of 4.4% in May 2007 to a post-recession high of 10.1% in October 2009, which was four 
months after the recession's official end. 
7
 Bruce D. Meyer, Wallace K. C. Mok, and James X. Sullivan, The Under-Reporting of Transfers in Household 
Surveys: Its Nature and Consequences, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 15181, July 
2009, http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 5181. 
8
 The unemployment rate measures the number of persons who are without a job or on layoff who are actively seeking 
work, as a percent of the civilian labor force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals). 
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Figure I. Monthly and Annual Average Unemployment Rate 
(January 1987 to February 2011) 
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) monthly unemployment rates, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymostJbls. 
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In addition to the recession's length and sustained elevated unemployment rate, the duration of an 
individual's spell of unemployment is another indicator of labor market stress. Figure 2 depicts 
the median number of weeks workers report having been unemployed. The figure shows that 
among unemployed workers, the median duration of unemployment in June 2010 was 25.5 
weeks—over half of unemployed persons had been without work for nearly six months. Peak 
median duration of unemployment in the aftermath of the most recent recession was over twice as 
long as the two previous recessions (11.5 weeks in June 2003, and 10 weeks in October 1994). In 
June 2010, the median duration of unemployment (25.5 weeks) was 3.5 times that of workers 
preceding the recession (June 2006, 7.3 weeks), and between 4.9 times (September 2000, 5.2 
weeks) to 5.3 times (4.8 weeks, November 1998) the median duration of unemployed workers in 
previous periods when the U.S. labor market was at peak employment. 
Figure 2. Median Duration of Unemployment among Unemployed Workers 
in Weeks, January 1987 to February 201 I 
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Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) estimates. 
An economic downturn may have other effects on the labor market than what is measured by the 
unemployment rate alone. For example, some former workers may drop out of the labor force all 
together and not bother to search for work, believing that no work is available and that job search 
would be fruitless—a category referred to as "discouraged workers. " Others may have recently 
searched for work, but are not currently looking for work because of other impediments, such as 
transportation problems or problems with child care arrangements, that keep them from actively 
searching for a job. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) refers to this group as "marginally 
attached" workers. For some, an economic downturn may result in a situation where they are 
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working part time but desire full-time work—a category sometimes referred to as 
"underemployed", or " employed part time for economic reasons. " 
In addition to the unemployment rate, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes alternative 
measures of labor underutilization.9 The most comprehensive alternative measure, U-6, includes 
the unemployed plus "discouraged" and other "marginally attached" workers, as well as persons 
who are "employed part time for economic reasons. " The "official" unemployment rate is based 
on the total number of unemployed as a percent of the civilian labor force (employed and 
unemployed workers, excluding the military). Under the alternative U-6 measure, "discouraged, 
marginally attached, and part-time workers for economic reasons" are added to the numerator of 
the "official" measure, and "discouraged and marginally attached" workers are added to the 
denominator.10 
9
 For a description of the alternative measures, see John E. Bregger and Steven E. Haugen, "BLS Introduces new range 
of alternative unemployment measures," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 108, no. 10 (October 1995), pp. 19-26. Labor 
force statistics from the CPS, including alternative measures, are available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost71n. 
10
 "Persons working part time for economic reasons"; 
the denominator of the "official" unemployment rate. 
 are already included in the civilian labor force definition used in 
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Figure 3 compares the BLS alternative U-6 rate of labor underutilization with the "official" 
unemployment rate. Estimates for the U-6 rate are first available in January 1994. In any period, 
the alternative expanded measure of labor underutilization, U-6, is considerably higher than the 
"official" unemployment rate; but in the wake of economic contractions, in particular, the U-6 
measure emphasizes a heightened level of labor market distress compared with the 
unemployment rate alone. Over the period examined, the U-6 rate was, on average, 75% above 
the "official" unemployment rate, and it ranged from 63% (December 2002) to 83% (April 2008) 
above. In October 2009, for example, the unemployment rate was at an historical peak of 10.1%, 
while the U-6 labor underutilization rate, also at an historical peak, was \1.A%—7.3 percentage 
points (72%) above the "official" unemployment rate 
Figure 3. Unemployment Rate and an 
Alternative Measure of Underutilization (BLS U-6 Definition) 
January 1987 to February 2011 
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) estimates. 
Notes: The BLS alternative U-6 measure of labor underutilization includes unemployed, discouraged, marginally 
attached, and part-time workers desiring more work hours as a percent of an expanded labor force that includes 
all such persons in addition to employed workers. 
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Unemployment Insurance 
Workers who lose their jobs face serious long-term economic implications. In general, they face a 
substantially reduced probability of full-time employment and an increased probability of part-
time employment. Permanently displaced workers (rather than job leavers or those who were on 
temporary lay-off) who find new full-time employment experience, on average, significantly 
decreased earnings relative to what they earned before they lost employment.11 
A variety of benefits may be available for unemployed workers. Those examined in this report 
can be generically grouped into the category of "Unemployment Insurance" benefits,12 which 
provide a cash supplement to replace a portion of lost wages to qualified unemployed 
individuals.13 Most unemployed workers who receive benefits generally receive benefits from the 
Unemployment Compensation (UC) program first. Those who exhaust UC benefits may be 
eligible for additional weeks of unemployment insurance through the temporary Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefit or through the permanent extended benefit (EB) 
program.14 These three benefits are often collectively referred to as Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) benefits. Generally, an unemployed worker would not notice a change in the type of benefit, 
as the benefit remains constant while the funding stream and/or the legislative authority for the 
benefit changes as the unemployed worker moves from one benefit type to another over the 
course of his or her spell of unemployment. 
Eligibility and Benefit Calculations for Unemployment Benefits 
Federal laws and regulations provide broad guidelines on UC benefit coverage, eligibility, and 
benefit determination, but the specifics of regular UC benefits are determined by each state. This 
results in essentially 53 different programs.15 States determine UC benefit eligibility, payments, 
1
' For example see Lori G. Kletzer, "Job Displacement," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 1 (Winter 
1998), pp. 115-136 and Henry S. Farber, "What do we know about job loss in the United States? Evidence from the 
Displaced Workers Survey, 1984—2004," Economic Perspectives: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 29, no. 2 
(2005), pp. 13-28. 
12
 See CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. 
Whittaker for full details. 
13
 For example, in addition to UI benefits, certain unemployed persons may qualify for continuation of group health 
insurance coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA; P.L. 99-272). See CRS 
Report: CRS Report R40142, Health Insurance Continuation Coverage Under COBRA, by Janet Kinzer. Also, certain 
workers who lose their jobs directly due to increased imports or shifts in production out of the United States may 
qualify for Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) or Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance Benefits 
(RTAA). See CRS Report RS22718, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) and Reemployment Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (RTAA), by John J. Topoleski. 
14
 UC benefits may be extended at the state level by the permanent EB program if high unemployment exists within the 
state. Once regular unemployment benefits are exhausted, the EB program may provide up to an additional 13 or 20 
weeks of benefits, depending on worker eligibility, state law, and economic conditions in the state. Under permanent 
law the EB program is funded 50% by the federal government and 50% by the states, although ARRA, as amended, 
temporarily provides for 100% federal funding of the EB program. 
15
 The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) administers the federal portion of the UC system, which operates in each state, 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Federal law sets broad rules that the 53 state programs 
must follow. These include the broad categories of workers that must be covered by the program, the method for 
triggering the EB and EUC08 programs, the floor on the highest slate unemployment tax rate to be imposed on 
employers (5.4%), and how the states will repay Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) loans. 
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and duration through state laws and program regulations. Generally, UC eligibility is based on 
attaining qualified wages and employment in covered work over a 12-month period (called a base 
period) prior to unemployment. 
The UC program pays benefits to workers in covered employment who become involuntarily 
unemployed for economic reasons and meet state-established eligibility rules. The UC program 
generally does not provide UC benefits to the self-employed, to those who are unable to work, or 
to those who do not have a recent earnings history. States usually disqualify claimants who lost 
their jobs because of inability to work or unavailability for work, who voluntarily quit without 
good cause, who were discharged for job-related misconduct, or who refused suitable work 
without good cause. 
This UC benefit is intended to help meet an unemployed worker's basic obligations until the 
worker finds a new position. Generally, states base benefit calculations on wages for covered 
work over a 12-month period, and in most states a full-time year-round worker would be eligible 
for 26 weeks of benefits.16 The entitlement formula varies by state, typically requiring a 
substantial work history and replacing up to 50% of workers' wages. Generally, benefits are 
capped at a percentage of the average wage for workers in the state and some states do 
not automatically link benefits to wage growth; these actions lowered the wage replacement rate 
for unemployment benefits to 34% of the average weekly wage for FY2010.17 
The permanent law Extended Benefit (EB) program was established by the Federal-State 
Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (EUCA) (P.L. 91-373; 26 U.S.C. 3304, 
note). This program was intended to be the permanent law solution for automatically creating a 
federal response to economic downturns. The program may extend receipt of unemployment 
benefits (extended benefits) at the state level if certain economic situations exist within the state. 
Under permanent law, the costs of these benefits are shared—with 50% paid by federal funds and 
50% by state funds. 
All states must pay up to 13 weeks of EB if the insured unemployment rate18 (IUR) for the 
previous 13 weeks is at least 5% and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week 
period in each of the two previous years. There are two other optional thresholds that states may 
choose. (States may choose one, two, or none.) If the state has chosen a given option, they would 
provide the following: 
• Option 1: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's IUR is at least 6%, 
regardless of previous years' averages. 
16
 Montana (28 weeks) and Massachusetts (30 weeks) have a higher maximum weeks of benefits. 
17
 See Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, UI Data Summary, 3 rd Quarter 2010 
(Revised), Washington , DC, 2010. U.S. State Summary Table, http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data_stats/ 
datasumlO/DataSum_2010_3.pdf. 
18
 The IUR is the ratio of UC claimants divided by individuals in UC-covered jobs. The IUR excludes several important 
groups: self-employed workers, unpaid family workers, workers in certain not-for-profit organizations, and several 
other, primarily seasonal, categories of workers. In addition to those unemployed workers whose last jobs were in the 
excluded employment, the insured unemployed rate excludes the following: those who have exhausted their UC 
benefits (even if they receive EB or EUC08 benefits); new entrants or reentrants to the labor force; disqualified workers 
whose unemployinent is considered to have resulted from their own actions rather than from economic conditions; and, 
eligible unemployed persons who do not file for benefits. 
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• Option 2: an additional 13 weeks of benefits if the state's total unemployment 
rate19 (TUR) is at least 6.5% and is at least 110% of the state's average TUR for 
the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years; or an additional 20 weeks 
of benefits if the TUR is at least 8% and is at least 110% of the state's average 
TUR for the same 13 weeks in either of the previous two years. 
Recent studies have suggested that whether an IUR or TUR trigger is used, the secular decline in 
unemployment over the past several decades has resulted in the current trigger levels being 
relatively difficult to attain.20 The current EB triggers have been criticized for deploying in many 
states long after a recession has started, for not deploying at all in some states with high 
unemployment, and for triggering off too quickly in some states. Analysts cite several reasons for 
this: (1) the general long-term decline in unemployment rates has made the current triggers 
irrelevant; (2) the rate and lookback provisions work against each other; and (3) amendments to 
the program in the early 1980s changed the unemployment calculation in a way that made EB 
activation less likely.21 
Changes in the Structure and Generosity of Unemployment 
Insurance 
This section briefly describes the various temporary unemployment benefit programs available in 
the last three recessions. Additionally, it attempts to explain how the current program and the 
ARRA provisions are intertwined and how they impact the amount of available unemployment 
benefits. 
Temporary Federal Unemployment Insurance Programs, 1987-2010 
In response to economic recessions, the federal government sometimes has augmented the regular 
(UC) benefit with both the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program and temporary expansions 
(including the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program) of unemployment benefits. 
These programs extended the time (in addition to the 26 weeks of basic UC benefits) an 
individual might claim benefits (up to an additional 20 weeks of EB and an additional 53 weeks 
of EUC08). Some extensions took into account state economic conditions; many temporary 
programs considered the state's average unemployment rate or the state's insured unemployment 
rate, or both.22 
From 1987 through 2010, there were three temporary programs that were in effect at different 
times. Table 1 on the following page provides basic information on the programs' beginning and 
19
 The TUR is the ratio of unemployed workers to all workers (employed and unemployed) in the labor market. The 
TUR is essentially a three-month averaged version of the unemployment rate published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and based on data from the BLS' monthly Current Population Survey. 
20
 For example, see Jeffrey B. Wenger and Matthew J. Walters, "Why Triggers Fail (and What to Do About It): An 
Examination of the Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits Program,' 'Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, vol. 25, no. 3 (2006), pp. 553-575. 
21
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 redefined the RJR to remove UC exhaustees and EB beneficiaries 
from the numerator. The act also eliminated the national IUR trigger, and raised the states' trigger to 5%. 
22
 CRS Report RL34340, Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions, by Julie M. Whittaker 
and Katelin P. Isaacs. 
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ending dates, and the lowest maximum duration and highest maximum duration for potential 
receipt of benefits during the programs' existences. The 1991 Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (EUC) program provided a maximum of between 13 and 33 weeks of benefits over 
its duration. The 2002 Temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (TEUC) program 
provided up to 26 weeks of temporary benefits for its duration. The current EUC08 program 
began in July 2008 and provided up to 20 weeks of benefits; over time the program has been 
modified to provide up to 53 weeks of benefits. Additionally, ARRA supplemented all 
unemployment benefits with an additional $25/week benefit (Federal Additional Compensation 
(FAC)) from March 2009 through May 2010. 
Table I. General Description of Temporary Federal Unemployment Insurance 
Programs, 1987- 2010 
Congress 
first enacts 
extension 
Program 
becomes 
active 
Minimum 
weeks of 
benefits 
available 
Maximum 
weeks of 
benefits 
available 
Authorization 
ended (does 
not include 
phase out) 
1990-1991 
Recession 
P.L. 102-164, 
EUC Benefits 
August 1991 
November 1991^ 
13 Weeks 
December 1993-
February 1994 
33 Weeks 
November 1991-
July 1992 
February 1994 
2001 Recession 
P.L. 107-147, TEUC 
Benefits 
February 2002 
March 2002 
26 Weeks 
November 2001-
January 2004 
26 Weeks 
November 2001-
January 2004 
January 2004 
2007 Recession 
P.L. 110-252, 
EUC08 Benefits 
June 2008 
July 2008 
13 Weeks 
July 2008-
November 2008 
53 Weeks 
Beginning December 
2009-Current 
Scheduled: End of 
December 2011 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). Timing of recessions from National Economic Bureau of 
Research, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
a. H.R. 3201 was passed on August 2, 1991; President George H.W Bush signed the bill (P.L. 102-107) but did 
not declare an emergency; thus, no benefits were available. Congress sent S. 1722 to the President who 
vetoed it on October i, 1991. For a statement on the reasons for the veto, see 
http://www.pres idency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20097. 
b. Although P.L. 102-164 was signed into law on November 15, 1991, it was immediately superseded by two 
other laws: P.L. 102-182, signed December 4, 1991, and P.L. 102-244, signed February 7,1992. P.L. 102-182 
authorized benefit periods of 20 and 13 weeks depending on state economic conditions; P.L. 102-244 
authorized an additional 13 weeks for each tier. 
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Interaction of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA; RL. 111-5) with Unemployment Benefits 
ARRA contained several provisions affecting unemployment benefits. Through the Federal 
Additional Compensation (FAC) program, ARRA temporarily increased unemployment benefits 
by $25 per week for all recipients of any type of unemployment insurance,23 and excluded $2,400 
in UC benefits from gross income under the federal income tax for 2009. ARRA extended the 
temporary EUC08 program through December 26, 2009 (with grandfathering). The EUC08 
program's expiration date has since been extended further, through December 2011. 
ARRA, as amended, provides for temporary 100% federal financing of the permanently 
authorized Extended Benefit (EB) program through December 2011. It also allows states the 
option of temporarily ignoring the programmatic "benefit year" requirement.24 Instead, states can 
choose to use exhaustion of EUC08 benefits as an eligibility requirement for weeks of EB benefit 
payments that fall between ARRA's enactment and expiration of 100% federal funding of the EB 
program, and as long as the state was triggered "on" for EB during the period when the individual 
was receiving EUC08.25 This has the effect of allowing more individuals to be eligible for the EB 
program.26 States are able to take advantage of this temporary financing structure by linking 
optional ways to have an active EB program with the temporary ARRA 100% federal financing 
scheme for EB.27 Furthermore, ARRA prohibited states from decreasing average weekly 
benefits.28 
Additionally, ARRA provides up to a total of $7 billion, total, in incentives to states to modify 
their basis for computing UI benefits and for extending benefits to currently ineligible 
individuals. Two-thirds of the $7 billion available to states is contingent on states first adopting an 
alternative method of determining eligibility for individuals who do not qualify under the regular 
method based on their wage and employment history.29 The states are then eligible for the 
remaining two-thirds of the $7 billion if they adopt at least two of the following four provisions: 
1. permit former part-time workers to seek part-time work; 
23
 Regular state unemployment benefits averaged just over $300 during the period the FAC was offered. An additional 
$25 would be approximately an 8% increase for an average benefit. Regardless of the state determined weekly benefit 
amount, each worker receiving any type of unemployment benefit would have received an additional $25 each week. 
Under permanent law, the benefit year is a one-year period during which a worker may receive benefits based on a 
previous period of unemployment. In all states, the beginning date of the benefit year depends on when a worker first 
files a valid claim, meaning the worker met state determined minimal earnings and employment requirements. 
25
 The EB program is "triggered on" when a state's unemployment level reaches certain levels. All states must pay up 
to 13 weeks of EB if the insured unemployment rate (a programmatic measure) for the previous 13 weeks is at least 5% 
and is 120% of the average of the rates for the same 13-week period in each of the two previous years. There are two 
other optional thresholds that states may choose. 
26
 All states opted for this calculation. 
27
 A total of 26 states opted for a temporary trigger. 
28
 When the FAC benefit was not extended by the amendments to ARRA in P.L. 111-205, the no reduction rule for 
weekly benefits was placed as an amendment to EUC08 (P.L. 110-252). 
29
 Information on state applications to receive the modernization payments and a summary of state actions to expand 
potential entitlement to unemployment benefits can be found under the "Ul Modernization Incentive Payments" on the 
webpage: http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp. 
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2. permit voluntary separations from employment for compelling family reasons, 
which must include (1) domestic violence, (2) illness or disability of an 
immediate family member, and (3) the need to accompany a spouse who is 
relocating for employment; 
3. provide extended compensation to UC recipients in qualifying training programs 
for high-demand occupations; or 
4. provide dependents' allowances to UC recipients with dependents. 
How Important Were the Temporary Programs to the Unemployed? 
It is difficult to assess the exact monetary impact of ARRAand the EUC08 program on the 
unemployed. However, data do exist to explain what percentage of the unemployed received 
unemployment benefits that were deployed on account of high unemployment (either the 
temporary benefit or the EB benefit). Figure 4 displays two data series. The lower line is the 
percentage of unemployed persons who received the regular (first 26 weeks) state UC benefit. 
The upper line includes this group combined with the unemployed who received additional 
temporary unemployment benefits (such as the EUC08 benefit) and the EB payments. 
Generally, as a recession winds down the percentage of unemployed who are receiving regular 
UC declines, as most of the unemployed are the long-term unemployed or new (or returning) 
labor market participants who are ineligible for regular UC benefits. The percentage of the 
unemployed receiving any UI benefit continues to increase as the proportion of long-term 
unemployed in the pool of unemployed workers increases. The ARRA provisions and the EUC08 
program temporarily expanded both the potential amount and the duration of unemployment 
benefits, exceeding the generosity of any previous congressional intervention. This can be seen in 
the increased percentage of the unemployed receiving UI benefits in 2009 and 2010—almost two-
thirds of all unemployed persons were receiving unemployment benefits (the highest level since 
1976). 
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Figure 4. Percent of Unemployed Receiving Unemployment Benefits 
1987-2010 
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Figure 5 depicts the average percentage of workers who received some kind of additional benefit 
beyond regular UC payments. In 2010, the percentage of unemployed who received additional 
benefits beyond regular UC was at least 17 percentage points higher than any other year in the 
previous two post-recession periods. 
Figure 5. Percentage of Unemployed Receiving Temporary (EUC,TEUC,or EUC08) 
Benefits or Extended Benefits 
1987-2010 
Source: Figure created by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from U.S. Department of Labor data. 
Antipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance 
The role unemployment insurance plays in poverty among the unemployed is well documented. A 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study found that the UI benefits reduced the 2009 poverty 
rate by 1.1 percentage points to 14.3 percent.30 Recent research by Vroman examined UI benefits 
and all other types of federal transfer payments from 2001 through 2008 and found that while the 
overall effect on the poverty rate was small the impact increases as the duration of unemployment 
50
 Gregory Acs and Molly Dahl, Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Family Income of the Unemployed, 
Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010, http://www.cbo.gOv/ftpdocs/l 19xx/docl 1960/11-
17-UnemploymentInsurance.pdf. 
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increases.31 In a brief analysis of the impact of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (P.L. 111 -5), Sherman estimated that 1.3 million people were kept out of poverty through 
additional temporary UI benefits.32 
This report contributes to this recent research on the antipoverty effects of unemployment 
insurance in several ways. Its period of analysis is longer and allows comparisons across the three 
most recent recessions. The report includes estimates of the effects on the poverty rate for the 
unemployed, those receiving UI, and for families that report at least one family member receiving 
UI. It also estimates how much of the total reported UI benefits went directly to decreasing family 
poverty levels. 
Antipoverty Effects of UI on All Persons 
This section examines the antipoverty effects of UI benefits primarily for all persons who 
received UI benefits (not just those who had limited labor force attachment due to economic 
reasons). Because the U.S. poverty measure is based on the income of all co-resident related 
family members, UI receipt affects not only the poverty status of the person receiving the benefit, 
but the poverty status of all related family members, as well. In 2009, while an estimated 13.0 
million people reported UI receipt during the year,33 an additional 20.0 million family members 
lived with the 13.0 million receiving the benefit. Consequently, UI receipt in 2009 affected the 
income status of some 33 million persons. 
Figure 6 shows the effect of UI benefit receipt on the overall poverty rate. The figure shows the 
percent of persons in poverty—both before counting UI benefits as income and after—using 
Census Bureau poverty income thresholds.34 The figure shows, for example, that in 2009, under 
the pre-UI benefit poverty measure, an estimated 15.4% of the population would have been 
counted as poor; the receipt of UI benefits reduced the poverty rate by 1.1 percentage points, to 
14.3%, the "official" U.S. poverty rate. Note that in 1993, the pre-UI poverty rate of 15.6% 
appears a bit higher than in 2009, although the difference is not statistically significant. However, 
in 1993, UI benefits resulted in reducing the poverty rate by only 0.5 percentage points, to the 
"official" rate of 15.1%. By this measure, the poverty reducing effect of UI in 2009 was about 
twice that of 1993. 
Wayne Vroman, The Great Recession, Unemployment Insurance and Poverty, Urban Institute, Paper Prepared for 
the Conference on Reducing Poverty and Economic Distress after ARRA, Washington, DC, January 15, 2010, 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412072_great_recession.pdf. 
32
 Arloc Sherman, Despite Deep Recession and High Unemployment, Government Efforts, -Including the Recovery 
Act- Prevented Poverty from Rising in 2009, New Census Data Show, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
Washington, DC, January 5, 2011, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cftn?fa=view&id=3361. 
33
 An estimated 10.7 million (82.6%) of those persons had limited or no attachment to a job during the year, due to 
economic reasons; i.e., were unemployed, worked fewer hours than desired, or were "discouraged" potential workers. 
(See Appendix B for more information UI benefit receipt by labor force status on the CPS/ASEC.) 
14
 Census Bureau poverty thresholds vary by family size and composition. In 2009, for example, the average poverty 
threshold for single persons living with no related family members was $10,956; for two related persons, $13,991, for 
three related persons, $17,098, and for four related persons, $21,954. 
Congressional Research Service 16 
Antipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance 
Figure 6. Pre- and Post-UI Benefit Poverty Rates of Persons, 1987-2009 
(Percent of persons who are poor before and after counting Ul benefits) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Figure 7 shows the number of persons (in millions) lifted above poverty by the receipt of UI 
benefits. The figure shows that in 2009, an estimated 3.3 million people were lifted above the 
official poverty line as the result of UI benefit receipt, of which nearly 1 million were children. In 
contrast, in 2003, UI lifted about 1.3 million persons out of poverty, of whom nearly one-third 
were children. 
Figure 7. Number of Persons Lifted Above Poverty as a Result of UI Benefit Receipt, 
1987-2009 
(Millions of persons) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Antipoverty Effect of UI on Persons in Families Receiving 
UI Benefits 
Figure 8 shows pre- and post-UI poverty rates among persons in which they or another family 
member received Ul benefits during the year. The figure is similar to Figure 6, except that figure 
showed the effect of UI benefit receipt on the overall U.S. poverty rate, whereas Figure 8 is only 
for persons in families that received UI benefits. The figure shows, for example, that in 2009, 
among individuals and families in which someone received UI benefits during the year, about 
one-fifth of persons (21.0%) would have been considered poor absent the UI benefits they 
received; UI benefits cut their incidence of poverty in half, to about one in ten persons (10.9%). 
Figure 8. Pre- and Post-UI Benefit Poverty Rates of Persons in Families that 
Received Ul Benefits, 1987-2009 
(Percent of persons who are poor before and after counting Ul benefits) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Figure 9 shows calculations derived from the data presented in Figure 6 and Figure 8. Figure 9 
shows that UI benefits in 2009 reduced the overall poverty rate by 7.1%, almost twice the next 
largest reduction of poverty attributable to UI benefits in 1992, when UI cut the overall poverty 
rate by 3.8%. Among persons in families and unrelated individuals that received UI benefits in 
2009, those benefits cut their poverty rate nearly in half (48%), compared to about one-third in 
1992 (32.5%) and nearly two-fifths (38.1%) in 2002. 
Figure 9. Percent Reduction in the Poverty Rate as a Result of UI Benefit Receipt, 
Overall Poverty Rate and Poverty Rate for Persons in Families that Received 
UI Benefits, 1987-2009 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Aggregate UI Dollars Going Towards Reducing Poverty 
Figure 10 shows that aggregate UI benefits reported on the CPS in 2009 ($97.5 billion) were 
over twice those reported in 1992 ($41.7 billion in 2009 constant dollars) and in 2002 ($44.4 
billion in 2009 constant dollars). In 2009, an estimated $17.6 billion in UI benefits went towards 
reducing poverty35 (18.1% of all UI dollars). In 1992, about $7.0 billion (in 2009 constant dollars, 
16.7% of all UI dollars), and in 2003, an estimated $5.8 billion (13.6% of all UI dollars) went 
towards poverty reduction. It should be noted that actual benefits paid out exceed the amount 
captured by the CPS/ASEC, as income amounts from virtually all income sources reported on the 
survey tend to fall short of administrative or other benchmarks (see Appendix C for further 
discussion). Figure 11 uses calculations from the data presented in Figure 10 to show the 
proportion of UI dollars that reduced poverty to all UI dollars. 
Figure 10. UI Benefits:Aggregate Dollars and Dollars Reducing Poverty, 1987-2009 
(In billions of 2009 constant dollars) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
Note: Dollars are estimates reported on the CPS/ASEC, which under-represent actual benefits paid to the 
unemployed. Among families considered poor before counting any UI benefits they received UI dollars filling the 
35
 Among families considered poor before counting any UI benefits they received, UI dollars filling the "poverty 
gap" represent the aggregate amount of UI benefits going towards filling the shortfall in families' incomes from 
their respective poverty income thresholds. 
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"poverty gap" represent the aggregate amount of Ul benefits going towards filling the shortfall in families' 
incomes from their respective poverty income thresholds. 
Figure 11. Share of Aggregate Ul Benefits Going Toward Reducing Poverty, 
1987-2009 
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Antipoverty Effect of UI Benefits Among Unemployed Individuals 
Figure 12 compares poverty rates among unemployed persons by whether they received UI 
benefits during the year, or not. (The figure differs from Figure 8, shown previously, which was 
for all persons in families that received Ul benefits). For those that received Ul benefits, both 
their pre-UI poverty rates and Post-UI poverty rates are shown. The figure shows, for example, 
that persons who received UI benefits had lower poverty rates, before counting any UI benefits 
they received, than their counterparts who did not receive UI benefits. In 2009, among persons 
who were unemployed and reported no UI benefit receipt (top line), nearly three in ten (29.1%) 
were poor. In contrast, about one quarter (24.3%) of unemployed persons who reported receiving 
UI benefits were poor, prior to counting any UI benefits they received (middle line). In most 
years, other than those immediately around recessionary periods, pre-UI poverty rates of persons 
who received UI benefits (middle line) ranged from 40% to 50% below those of their 
unemployed counterparts who did not receive UI benefits (top line). Immediately after 
recessionary periods the differences in poverty rates before UI receipt is calculated narrows. For 
example, in 1993, the pre-UI poverty rate of persons receiving UI benefits was 36% below that of 
persons not receiving UC; in 2003, 26% below; and in 2009, 16% below. 
Figure 12. Pre-Post Ul Poverty Rates Among Unemployed Persons Who 
Received Ul Benefits and Those Who Did Not, 1987-2009 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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UI benefits dramatically reduce the incidence of poverty among the population who receive them. 
In 2009, for example, about one quarter (24.3%) of unemployed people who received UI benefits 
would have been considered poor prior to counting the UI benefits they received (middle line); 
after counting UI benefits, their poverty rate was cut by well over half, to 10.5% (bottom line). In 
contrast, in the two previous recessions, UI benefits to the unemployed reduced their incidence of 
poverty from a pre-UI poverty rate of 18.9% to a post-UI poverty rate of 10.1% in 2003, and from 
18.3% to 11.2% in 1993. Based on this, and the other evidence presented in this analysis, UI 
benefits in the most recent recession appeared to have played a significantly greater role in 
reducing poverty than in either of the two previous recessions. 
Summary 
Our analysis shows that UI benefits appear to significantly reduce the incidence of poverty among 
the population who receives them. The programs' poverty reduction effects appear to be 
especially important during and immediately after recessions. Our analysis also finds that there 
was a markedly higher impact on poverty in 2009 than in the previous two recessionary periods. 
The estimated antipoverty effects of UI benefits in 2009 were about twice that of two previous 
peak years of unemployment, in 1993 and 2003. This may be attributable to the temporary 
provisions of ARRA and the EUC08 program which increased both benefit levels and benefit 
duration. 
• In 2009, about one-quarter (24.3%) of unemployed people who received UI 
benefits would have been considered poor prior to counting the UI benefits they 
received; after counting UI benefits, their poverty rate was cut by well over half, 
to 10.5%. 
• Because the U.S. poverty measure is based on the income of all co-resident 
related family members, UI receipt affects not only the poverty status of the 
person receiving the benefit, but the poverty status of all related family members, 
as well. In 2009, while an estimated 13.0 million people reported UI receipt 
during the year, an additional 20.0 million family members lived with the 13.0 
million receiving the benefit. Consequently, UI receipt in 2009 affected the 
income status of some 33 million persons. 
• The poverty rate for persons in families who received unemployment benefits in 
2009 was approximately half of what it would have been without those 
unemployment benefits. 
• In 2009, UI benefits lifted an estimated 3.3 million people out of poverty, 
including nearly a million children living with a family member who received UI 
benefits. 
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Appendix A. Legislative Details of the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) Program 
On June 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 
2008 (P.L. 110-252) into law. Title IV of this act created a new temporary unemployment 
insurance program, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. This was 
the eighth time Congress had created a federal temporary program that has extended 
unemployment compensation during an economic slowdown. The authorization for this program 
continues until December 31, 2011. 
Currently this temporary unemployment insurance program provides up to a total of 53 additional 
weeks of UI benefits. It provides up to 20 additional weeks of unemployment benefits to most 
workers who have exhausted their rights to regular UC benefits. A second tier of benefits provides 
up to an additional 14 weeks of benefits (for a total of 34 weeks of EUC08 benefits available for 
all unemployed workers regardless of state unemployment rates). A third tier is available in states 
with a total unemployment rate of at least 6% and provides up to an additional 13 weeks of 
EUC08 benefits (for a total of 47 weeks of EUC08 benefits). A fourth tier is available in states 
with a total unemployment rate of at least 8.5% and provides up to an additional six weeks of 
EUC08 benefits (for a total of 53 weeks of EUC08 benefits).36 
The EUC08 program has been amended by P.L. 110-449, P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-92, P.L. 111-118, 
P.L. 111-144, P.L. 111-157, P.L. 111-205, and P.L. 111-312. In July 2008, the program began with 
a flat 20 weeks of entitlement. In November 2008, P.L. 110^449 created an additional 13 week 
entitlement for workers in states with high unemployment for a total of 33 weeks of benefits 
available. This entitlement was expanded by an additional 20 weeks (up to 14 additional weeks in 
all states and 6 additional weeks in very high unemployment states) resulting in a potential of 53 
weeks as required by P.L. 111-92 in November 2009. 
16
 The total unemployment rate is a three-month seasonally adjusted average of the state's monthly unemployment rate. 
For a detailed legislative history of the EUC08 program see CRS Report RL34340, Extending Unemployment 
Compensation Benefits During Recessions, by Julie M. Whittaker and Katelin P. Isaacs. 
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Appendix B. Trends in Labor Force Status and Ul 
Receipt Over Time 
This appendix presents an analysis of trends in labor force status and Ul receipt, as reported in the 
CPS/ASEC. The analysis is based on labor force status in the year preceding the CPS/ASEC 
survey, based on survey respondents' accounts. 
The appendix provides contextual reference of different measures of labor "underutilization," 
including monthly and annual monthly averages of unemployment compared to estimates for 
persons unemployed at anytime during the year (the definition of unemployed used in the report's 
CPS/ASEC analysis). It also examines and more expansive definitions of labor utilization, which 
in addition to unemployed (persons without a job who looked for work) includes involuntary part-
time workers and discouraged workers (those who did not search for work believing suitable 
work is not available). The appendix examines Ul receipt reported on the CPS/ASEC among 
persons of the above, and other, labor force statuses. 
The CPS/ASEC collects information on over 50 sources of income, and up to 27 individual 
income values—Ul benefits are among the many income sources and amounts captured by the 
survey, since 1988. CPS/ASEC survey respondents report their yearly income from each specific 
source. See Appendix C for a comparison of CPS/ASEC estimates of Ul receipt and amounts 
with administrative benchmarks of Ul claims and benefit amounts. 
Unemployed Persons and Those with Limited Labor Force 
Attachment Relating to Economic Conditions Who Reported Ul 
Receipt 
Figure B-l shows persons who reported Ul benefit receipt and their labor force status in 2009, 
based on CRS analysis of the 2010 CPS/ASEC. The analysis primarily focuses on several groups 
of persons who are unemployed or who have limited labor force attachment over the year that 
may be associated with economic conditions. These groups are represented in the left-hand 
portion of the figure. Among these groups are those who most likely might qualify for Ul 
benefits. The groups (with the percent of each group represented among persons who reported Ul 
receipt in 2009) include 
• "Unemployed" (73.1%): persons who reported having worked less than full year 
and looked for work during the year or were on layoff; 
• " Involuntary part-time workers " (4.4%): persons who worked all year but 
reported having worked less than full time (35 or more hours per week) due to 
slack work or because they could only find part-time work. 
• "Part-year discouraged workers " (2.3%): persons who worked only part year, 
but did not search for work because they believed no work was available; 
In addition to the groups above, who were all in the labor force during the year by virtue of 
having had a job and/or looked for work, the analysis includes 
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• "Discouraged potential workers, outside the labor force " (2.9%): persons who 
were out of the labor force for the entire year and reported that they did not look 
for work because they believed no work was available. 
The four groups delineated above represent those respondents on the CPS who might most 
reasonably be expected to be among the population potentially qualified to receive UI benefits. 
They represent the majority of persons, 10.7 million (82.6%) of 13.0 million who reported 
receiving UI benefits in 2009, and constitute the major groups that appear to have had limited 
work force/labor force attachment associated with economic conditions?1 
Other Labor Force Statuses of Persons Who Reported UI Receipt 
Included among persons on the CPS who report UI receipt, not all appear to have limited labor 
force attachment that might seem to be directly associated with economic conditions. These 
groups are depicted on the right-hand side of Figure B-l. Reported receipt of UI among these 
cases is somewhat incongruent with their reported labor force status during the year. These 
groups that reported UI receipt include 
• "Full-time, Full-Year Workers" (6.0%): persons who reported having worked 
full-time (35 or more hours per week), full-year (50 to 52 weeks) and did not 
look for work during the year; 
• "Out of the labor force (OLF),full or part-year, for personal reasons " (9.7%): 
persons who were out of the labor force for part or the entire year (i.e., did not 
look for work during the period they were without work) and reported that the 
primary reason they were not working was because they were ill or disabled, 
taking care of home or family, going to school, or retired; 
• " Voluntary part-time workers " (1.5%): persons who worked part time for the 
entire year, because they wanted part time work ; 
• "Persons in the armed forces living off base " (0.1%). 
The somewhat anomalous report of UI among the above groups may be due to misreporting of UI 
benefit receipt itself, or imprecise reporting of their labor force attachment over the course of the 
year.38 For example, in the latter case, a respondent may have been unemployed during part of the 
year, and later in the year enrolled in school, or decided to retire. Individuals who were enrolled 
in school may be eligible for unemployment benefits while attending Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA)-approved training programs. 
"For more information on why alternative measures of unemployment statistics may be used see U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Unemployment Rate and Beyond: Alternative Measures, Issues in Labor 
Statistics, Summary 08-06, Washington, DC, June 2008, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/opbils67.pdf. 
38
 Furthermore, there are several small programs that allow workers to receive unemployment benefits while working 
close to full-time hours. (See CRS Report R40689, Compensated Work Sharing Arrangements (Short-Time 
Compensation) as an Alternative to Layoffs, by Alison M. Shelton) Under some state UI programs it is possible for the 
unemployed to be in training/educational pursuits as long as certain criteria are met. 
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Figure B-1. Persons Who Reported Ul Benefit Receipt, by Labor Force Status: 2009 
Unemployed, Underutilized, and Discouraged Workers due to 
Economic Conditions (10.708 million persons) 
Other Labor Force Statuses of Persons Reporting Ul Receipt 
(2.248 million persons) 
Unemployed 73.1% 
Invotunttry part-time workers 
4.4% 
year worker discouraged 
workers 2.3% 
Discouraged potential 
workers, OLF* 2.9% 
OLF" part-year for personal 
reasons 5.5% 
OLF* full-year for personal 
reasons 4.3% 
Worked All Year,FtHI-Time 6.0% 
Voluntary part-time workers 
1.5% 
Armed Forces 0.1% 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Populatbn Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 2010. 
Note: * Persons Outside the Labor Force (OLF). 
CRS-28 
Antipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance 
Comparing the Share of Unemployed and Underutilized Workers 
at Any Time During the Year to Monthly and Annual Average 
Unemployment Statistics 
Figure B-2 compares annual measures of unemployment and labor underutilization derived from 
CRS analysis of CPS/ASEC data with the monthly unemployment rate, and annual average 
monthly employment rate (as published by the BLS, based on the monthly CPS, presented at the 
beginning of this report in Figure 1). 
It is important to note that CRS CPS/ASEC unemployment and labor underutilization rate 
estimates are based on survey respondents' accounting of their labor force status over an entire 
year. By this measure, a respondent would be considered unemployed if they were unemployed at 
any time during the year. The odds are greater that a person will be unemployed at any time 
during the year, than at a particular point in time during the year. Consequently, the CRS 
CPS/ASEC unemployment and labor underutilization measures are both higher than 
corresponding BLS monthly and annual average monthly measures. The BLS monthly 
unemployment rate peaked at 10.1% in October 2009; whereas, the annual average monthly rate 
for 2009 was 9.3%. In contrast, the CRS CPS/ASEC unemployment rate, measuring persons who 
were ever unemployed during the year as share of the labor force, was 13.0%—a full 3.3 
percentage points above the annual average monthly rate. Similarly, the CRS CPS/ASEC 
underutilized worker rate was 19.5% in 2009; this compares to an annual average monthly rate 
for the BLS U-6 alternative unemployment measure of 16.3% for 2009 (compare with Figure 3, 
shown earlier). 
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Figure B-2. Share of Unemployed and Underutilized Workers at Any Time During 
the YearCompared to Monthly and Annual Average Unemployment 
(January 1987 to February 2011) 
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Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual and Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC). 1988 to 2010; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) monthly unemployment rates, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymostJbls. 
* Monthly and annual average of monthly unemployment rates from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
monthly unemployment rates, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?bls. 
** CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC of persons who where unemployed at any time during the year, as a share 
of labor force participants during the year plus "discouraged potential workers" outside the labor force. 
*** CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC of persons who where unemployed at any time during the year plus 
underutilized workers (part-year discouraged workers, involuntary part-time workers, and discouraged potential workers, 
outside the labor force) as a share of labor force participants during the year plus "discouraged potential workers" 
outside the labor force. 
Trends in Unemployment and Alternate Measures of Labor 
Underutilization 
Figure B-3 provides estimates of the number of persons whose job attachment may have been 
limited due to economic conditions. The labor force definition used here includes all civilians age 
15 and older who held a job at any time during the year, or looked for work. In addition, it 
includes persons who were outside the labor force (OLF) for the entire year, who indicated that 
they did not search for work because they believed no work was available—a group categorized 
as "discouragedpotential workers." This group is generally not included in the standard labor 
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force definition. For brevity, the term labor force is used throughout the analysis, but it should be 
kept in mind that it includes "discouraged potential workers (DPW)." 
As shown in Figure B-3, an estimated 26.2 million persons were unemployed at some time 
during 2009. Another 9.0 million were involuntary part-time workers, who desired more hours of 
work. An additional 2.0 million persons worked only part year, but did not search for work 
because they believed no work was available. Finally, another 1.9 million discouraged potential 
workers were outside the labor force for the entire year, indicating that they did not search for 
work because they believed no work was available. In total, in 2009, an estimated 39.1 million 
persons had limited or no labor force attachment during the year that may have been associated 
with economic conditions. This compares to an estimated 29.4 million such persons in 1993, and 
24.2 million in 2003, which marked previous peaks of slack employment in the U.S. economy. 
Figure B-3. Expanded Definitions of Unemployment and Labor Underutilization, 
1987-2009 
(Numbers in millions) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Figure B-4 shows that in 2009, an estimated 13% of the labor force was unemployed at some 
time during the year, which was similar to the earlier peak in 1991 and 1992 (12.9%39). The 1990-
1991 recession contributed to the share of the labor force experiencing some period of 
unemployment rising from a pre-recession low of 10.9% in 1988, to a high of 12.9% in 1991 and 
1992 (a 3 percentage point increase). In contrast, under the most recent recession, the share of the 
labor force experiencing some period of unemployment during the year rose from a pre-recession 
low of 8% in 2006, to 13% in 2009 (a 5 percentage point increase). 
The figure shows that in 2009 nearly one-fifth of the labor force (19.5%) had limited labor force 
attachment for economic reasons, up from a pre-recession low of 12.1% in 2006 (a 7.4 percentage 
point increase). In addition to the unemployed, involuntary part-time workers accounted for 4.5%) 
of the labor force, and part-year discouraged workers and discouraged potential workers each 
accounted for 0.9% of the labor force. The top line in Figure B-4 presents the sum of each of 
these groups to create a total unemployment rate using this expanded definition of individuals 
who were unemployed and is the same as the top line in Figure B-2. The share of the labor force 
under this expanded definition of unemployed in 2009 was nearly 2 percentage points above the 
previous high of 17.6% in 1992. 
' The differences between the two peaks are not statistically significant. 
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Figure B-4.An Expanded Definition of Unemployed and Underutilized Workers, 
1987-2009 
Percent of unemployed workers, workers with involuntary part-time or part-year status, and discouraged 
potential workers who are outside the labor force (OLF) 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
Unemployment Insurance Receipt Among Persons Who Were 
Unemployed or Who Had Limited or No Labor Force Attachment 
for Economic Reasons 
Figure B-5 shows the share of persons who reported receiving UI benefits, by their labor force 
status during the year. The figure includes only persons who had limited or no labor force 
attachment during the year due to economic reasons or who met the CPS definition of 
unemployed. In 2009, these groups accounted for 10.7 million persons, or over four-fifths 
(82.6%) of the 13.0 million who reported receiving UI benefits. 
The figure shows that 36.1% of persons who were unemployed received UI benefits in 200940— 
above the peak rates associated with previous recessions (34.4% in 1992 and 32.7% in 2002). The 
figure shows that the UI recipiency rate among discouraged potential workers who had been out 
40
 Note, this estimate from the CPS/ASEC is considerably less than the 62% shown earlier in Figure 4, which is based 
on administrative data. For a discussion of CPS/ASEC estimates compared to administrative data benchmarks, see 
Appendix C. 
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of the labor force for the entire year was 19.7% in 2009, well above 12.5% in 1992, and 10.2% in 
2003. However, as shown earlier in Figure B-5, this group accounts for only a small share of 
persons who had limited or no labor force attachment due to economic reasons. Among all 
persons with limited or no labor force attachment for economic reasons, 27.4% reported receipt of 
UI benefits in 2009, the same share as the peak recipiency rate in 1992, and somewhat above the 
25.7% rate in 2002. 
Figure B-5. Unemployment Insurance Receipt Among Persons, 
by Selected Labor Force Status, 1987 - 2009 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010. 
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Appendix C. CPS/ASEC Estimates Versus 
Administrative Benchmarks 
It is difficult to compare the monthly administrative Ul data on the number of individuals 
receiving unemployment benefits to the one-time monthly survey CPS/ASEC data of those 
individuals who have reported receiving unemployment benefits in the past year. According to the 
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in 2009, approximately $137 billion in "unemployment 
benefits" were distributed to individuals. These benefits included UC, EB, and EUC08 as well as 
several smaller benefits such as the Disaster Unemployment Assistance and Trade Re-Adjustment 
Allowances. In comparison $97.5 billion in aggregate UI benefits were reported in the 
CPS/ASEC. Thus, in 2009, aggregate UI benefits reported on the CPS/ASEC accounted for about 
71 % of the administrative benchmark; approximately 29% of UI benefits in the aggregate were 
not reported/underreported. Importantly for this analysis, this appears to be a fairly consistent 
ratio of benefit reporting in the CPS/ASEC (see the top line in Figure C-l). 
The U.S. DOL does not calculate the number of individuals who received unemployment benefits 
at any point during the year, but rather it reports the number of individuals receiving benefits as a 
monthly statistic. Approximately 62% of the unemployed received unemployment benefits on 
average in any given month in 2009. Using the CPS/ASEC data, this analysis estimated that 
approximately 36% of the unemployed reported receiving a UI benefit at least for some point 
during the year. 
There may be empirical reasons for the yearly ratio to be lower than the monthly ratio. One such 
reason is that generally those who receive unemployment benefit are likely to remain unemployed 
longer than those who do not receive such benefits. Thus, UI recipients may be appear in the 
monthly calculations for more months than non-UI recipients driving up the percentage of UI 
beneficiaries in the monthly calculations relative the annual calculations where both UI 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are each counted one time. Given that the ratio of 
underreporting the total value of UI benefits is less than the ratio of underreporting UI benefit 
receipt this suggests that those who received lower values of aggregated UI benefits are more 
likely to not report benefit receipt. 
Figure C-l examines this pattern of under-reporting UI benefits by comparing estimates of 
aggregate UI benefits and number of recipients on the CPS/ASEC relative to DOL administrative 
benchmarks, from 1987 through 2009. The two lines depict the CPS/ASEC estimate as a percent 
of DOL administrative benchmarks based on UI spending and benefits data. CPS/ASEC estimates 
are for persons who reported having received any type of UI benefits at any time during the year. 
Estimates of the number of recipients from DOL UI administrative data are based on the total 
number of persons receiving UC benefits at the beginning of the year plus the total number of 
persons receiving initial monthly UC benefits during the year plus the number of persons 
receiving UC for former federal workers (UCFE), UC for former servicemembers (UCX), 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA), EB, EUC08 
and the other temporary extended benefits at the beginning of the year ?{ 
41
 Mathematically, this approach will result in counting the number of first week of regular UC beneficiaries twice and 
not counting any new entrants into the UCFE, UCX, and DUA program if the first benefit was paid after the first week 
of the new year. 
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Figure C-l shows that aggregate benefits reported on the CPS/ASEC ranged from a low of 68% 
of the administrative benchmark in 2007, to a high of 88% in 1995. As noted above, the 
CPS/ASEC does an apparently better job at capturing UI dollars, in the aggregate, than it does in 
the number persons receiving benefits. Over the period examined, the CPS/ASEC appears to 
capture roughly 59% of persons who receive UI benefits based on claims data with the ratio 
generally increasing during recessions and decreasing as the recovery takes hold. The ratio ranges 
from a low of 49% in 2004, 2006, and 2007, to a high of 73% in 1993. As noted above, the 
CPS/ASEC appears to do a better job in capturing aggregate UI dollars than it does in capturing 
UI recipients would suggest that persons who receive comparatively small UI benefits, and/or 
claim benefits for a comparatively short period of time, are less likely to report UI benefit receipt 
on the CPS/ASEC. 
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Figure C-1. Ul Recipients and Aggregate Ul Dollars 
CPS/ASEC Estimates as a Percent of Administrative Benchmarks 
1987 to 2009 
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Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates from U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS/ASEC), 1988 to 2010; and DOL Unemployment Insurance 
Reporting System. 
Notes: Recipient estimates are based on reported receipt of Ul on the CPS/ASEC and DOL Ul claims data. 
CPS/ASEC estimates are for persons who reported having received any type of Ul benefits at any time during the 
year. Estimates of the number of recipients from DOL Ul administrative data are based on the total number of 
persons receiving UC benefits at the beginning of the year plus the total number of persons receiving initial 
monthly UC benefits during the year plus the number of persons receiving DUA, UC for federal workers, UC for 
ex-military service members, trade readjustment assistance, EB, EUC08, and the other temporary federal 
extended benefits at the beginning of the year. 
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